On October 21, 1915, Grey met Cambon and proposed to France to appoint a representative to discuss the future borders of Syria, As Britain wished to support the creation of an independent Arab state. At that time, Grey was faced with competing claims from the French and the Husseins and had sent a telegram to Cairo the day before in which he announced to the High Commissioner that he was as vague as possible in his next letter to Den Sharif when he spoke of the northwestern Syrian corner of the territory claimed by Hussein, leaving McMahon « discretion on the matter, because it is urgent and there is no time to discuss a specific formula. » and to add: « If something more precise than necessary, you can give it. »  After the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, the Allies–Britain, France, and Russia—had much discussion about the future of the Ottoman Empire, which is now fighting on the side of Germany and the middle powers, and its immense territory in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and southern Central Europe. In March 1915, Britain signed a secret agreement with Russia, whose plans on the territory of the Empire had led the Turks to join forces with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1914. Russia would annex the Ottoman capital Constantinople and retain control of the Dardanelles (the extremely important strait that connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean) and the Gallipoli Peninsula, which began in April 1915. In exchange, Russia would accept British claims to other territories of the former Ottoman Empire and central Pere, including the oil-rich region of Mesopotamia. The Sykes-Picot agreement was in direct contradiction to the promises of freedom that the British made to the Arabs in exchange for their support for the collapse of the Ottomans. In May, Clayton Balfour said that in response to a proposal that the agreement was contentious, Picot had « admitted that a significant revision was needed given the changes in the situation since the agreement was drafted, » but nonetheless considered that « the agreement was in any case valid in principle. » Loevy makes a similar point with regard to sections 4 to 8 of the agreement and refers to the British and French who practiced « Ottoman colonial development as insiders » and that this experience served as a roadmap for subsequent war negotiations.  while Khalidi highlighted Britain`s and France`s negotiations on the homs-Baghdad railways in 1913 and 1914, as well as their agreements with Germany in other regions, as a « clear basis » for their subsequent spheres of influence under the agreement.  The agreement is seen by many as a turning point in Western and Arab relations. He denied the promises made by the United Kingdom to the Arabs regarding an Arab national homeland in the territory of Greater Syria, in exchange for British support for the Ottoman Empire. . . .